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TAXATION
JosEPH CURTis*
LEGISLATION

The only tax legislation enacted by the General Assembly at its 1959 extra
session of sufficient general interest to warrant comment is that excluding
from gross income interest upon obligations issued by educational institutions under chapter 3 of title 23 of the 1950 Code of Virginia.1
jUDICIAL DECISIONS

Perhaps most noteworthy of the few cases involvi..ng Virginia taxation
during the current period, at least in doctrinal significance, was the United
States Supreme Court's affirmance of the Supreme Court of Appeals' 1957
decision in Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Conr11zonwealth.2
A. Gross Receipts as Measure of Going Concern Value
A state franchise tax may not be imposed upon an exclusively interstate
business for the privilege of doing such business in the state.3 This principle,
despite some prior waverings, was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court of the
United States in 1954 to the temporary embarrassment of Vrrginia's State
Corporation Commission.4 The Commission had sought to impose upon
Railway Express Agency, a Delaware corporation doing only interstate
business in Virginia, an annual license tax measured by apportioned gross
receipts, the taxing statute then reading that it was "for the privilege of
doing business in the state." 5 The Supreme Court of Appeals was persuaded

• Professor of Law, William and Mary. Member, Virginia and New York Bars. B.S.,
1934, LL.B., 1937, LLM., 1948, New York University.
I. VA. CoDE ANN. § 58-78(b) (5) (Additional Supp. 1959).
2. 199 Va. 589, 100 S.E.2d 785 (1957), aff'd sub nom. Railway Express Agency, Inc.
v. Virginia, 358 U.S. 434 (1959).
3. Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
4. Railway E:'l:press Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 347 U.S. 359 (1954).
5. VA. CoDE ANN. § 58-547 ('1950).
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that it was in essence a property ta.-..:: upon the intangible going concern
value of the company,6 the constitutional validity of which was well supported by United States Supreme Court precedents. However, the adverse
wording of the statute, coupled with some mathematical disputations by
Mr. Justice Jackson,7 convinced five members of the Supreme Court that
the ta.-..:: was what the statute said it was-a tax on the privilege of doing
interstate business.s
In 1956 the VirgLTJ.ia legislature amended t..~e statute by eliminating the
"privilege" purpose and specifically providing that the franphise ta.-..:: was in
lieu of other taxes on intangibles and rolling stock.9 However, apportionment of gross receipts derived from transportation within the state of express transported through, into, or out of the state was retained as the
measure of the tax. 10 Once again the Supreme Court of Appeals, reinforced
by the more palatable amendment, found the tax to be a valid substitute for
one on the company's intangible going concern value and rolling stock. 11 The
Supreme Court, viewing the commerce clause question to be solely whether
the ta.-..:: in practical operation was on p-roperty or on privilege, affirmed.
Acknowledging that the views of three Virginia agencies12 were entitled to
considerable weight, the Court found that the amendment was not a mere
change of labels and that apportioned gross receipts were a constitutionally
acceptable, although not the best, measure of going concern value.13

B. Inheritance Taxation of Appointed Property
Inheritance ta.~tion of property passing by testamentary exercise of a
power of appointment received further consideration from the Supreme
Court of Appeals in Commonwealth v. Davis.14 The Court had previously
6. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 194 Va. 757, 75 S.E.2d 61 (1953),
rev'd sub 110111. Railway E.;:press Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 347 U.S. 359 (1954).
7. Mr. Justice Jackson's mathematics were directed at the huge disproportion between
the initial cost of the Railway Express' assets and their assemblage value found by using
gross receipts as the taxable base.
8. Railway E.'q)ress Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 347 U.S. 359 (1954); see note 3 supra
and accompanying text.
9. VA. CoDE ANN.§ 58-546, -547 (Supp. 1958).
10. VA. CoDE ANN.§ 58-547 (Supp. 1958).
II. Railway E.'q)ress Agency, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 199 Va. 589, 100 S.E.2d 785
(1957), aff'd sub 110111. Railway E.'q)ress Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 358 U.S. 434 (1959);
see Curtis, Taxation, 1957-1958 A1111. Survey of Va. Law, 44 VA. L. REv. 1217, 1220
.{1958).
12. The General Assembly, Supreme Court of Appeals and State Corporation Commission.
13. Railway E.'q)ress Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 358 U.S. 434, 441 (1959) (dictum).
This decision is likely to have a profound, national effect on state taxation of interstate
commerce.
14. 200 Va. 308, 105 S.E.2d 819 (1958).
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resolved that the exercise of a power is a taxable event, but the appointed
property is not to be coupled with the donee's own property, although both
pass to the same legatee, in determining the applicable exemption and rate
bracket.l5 However, the Virginia statute taxes only such property as is
"within the jurisdiction of this Commonwealth," til and the question before
the Court in Davis was whether the intangible corpus of a New York trust
created by a New York settlor was within the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth when appointed by a donee domiciled in Virginia. The issue was
somewhat complicated by the fact that at the time of its creation the power
of appointment was general and the donee a resident of New York. Subsequently the donee became a resident of Virginia; thereafter she converted
the general power into a special one by releasing all her rights to appoint the
trust corpus to herself, her creditors or the creditors of her estate. The lower
court had held that the trust property was not brought within the jurisdiction of Virginia by reason of the donee becoming domiciled in this state and
here exercising the power by willP The trial judge thought this conclusion
conformed ·with that of the Supreme Court of Appeals in Commonwealth v.
Morris,t 8 in which the New York setdor of a New York trust was held not
to have brought the trust intangibles within the Commonwealth's jurisdiction
by reason of his having reserved a life interest in the trust and subsequently
becoming domiciled in Virginia.19 The Court of Appeals, however, distinguished the Morris case on the ground that Morris, the setdor-life beneficiary, had divested himself of all control over the trust properties when
he became a resident of Virginia. On the other hand, the Court pointed out
that in Davis the donee's control over the trust corpus was so substantial that
it was tantamount to ownership of it. Therefore, the doctrine of mobilia
sequuntur personam applied. It is difficult to reconcile the Court's conclusion that for purposes of tax imposition the power to dispose of trust property at death is the equivalent of ownership but that for the purpose of
determining tax exemptions and rate brackets the appointed property is to
be taxed independently of the donee's own property.
Together Commonwealth v. Carter20 and Commonwealth v. Davis21 would
15. Commonwealth v. Carter, 198 Va. 141, 92 SE.2d 369 (1956).
16. VA. CoDE ANN. § 58'-152 (1950).
17. Davis v. Commonwealth, In the Crrcuit Court of the City of Richmond, Order
Book No. 66, p. 297, entered July 17, 1957. For a discussion of the circuit court
decision, see Curtis, Taxation, 1956-1951 Ann. Survey of Va. Law, 43 VA. L. REv. 989,
992 (1957).
18. 196 Va. 868', 86 SE.2d 135 (1955).
19. H the settlor had been a resident of Virginia when the trust was created as well
as at the time of his death, the settlor's reservation of a life interest would have clearly
rendered the trust taXable at his death under VA. CoDE ANN.§ 58-152(4) (1950).
20. 198 Va. 141, 92 SE.2d 369 (1956).
21. 200 Va. 308, 105 SE.2d 819 (1958).
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seem to establish the following inheritance tax treatment for powers of
appointment. The creation of a power by the settlor-donor is not a taxable
event;22 the exercise of the power by the donee is a ta.:'{able event; nevertheless the common law relation back theory, i.e., the appointed property passes
directly from the donor to the appointee, applies for determination of
exemptions and rate brackets; jurisdiction over appointed intangibles is acquired through domicile of the donee. Not yet conclusively resolved is how
these results might be varied depending upon whether the power is general
or special. The Court in Davis directed little or no attention to this point.23
C.

Property Tax on Bonds of Public Service Corporations

Virginia Code section 58-524 requires that railway companies report
annually to the State Corporation Commission "all personal property . . .
which would be ta..-..:able if the same belonged to an individual," 24 and section
58-51625 imposes a ta..-..: on such companies' intangible personal property.
Southern Railway and another railroad owned bonds issued by states other
than Virginia on which ta.-..:es were assessed and paid pursuant to section
58-516. The companies sought refunds, contending that they were not
required to report the bonds to the Commission because the bonds were no
longer taxable in the hands of individuals since section 58-406, as amended,26
provides that for years subsequent to 1953 ta.."l:es on net incomes shall be
in lieu of a specific property tax on all bonds. The railroads further argued
that the excepting clause in section 58-406 which serves to continue the
intangible property ta..-.,: on "bonds, notes and other evidences of debt of
public service corporations" should be construed to mean only such bonds
as are issued by such corporations and not those held by them. The Supreme Court of Appeals rejected both contentions in Southern Ry. v. Commonwealth.21 Justice I'Anson, writing for the Court, pointed out that
certain classes of individuals are not relieved from the property ta.."l: on
bonds and that as they continue to be taxable in the hands of some indi22. Although the Court had no occasion to pass upon this proposition in either Carter
or Davis, VA. CoDE ANN. § 58-173 (Supp. 1958) imposes the tax upon a future interest
only when it vests in possession. Since the appointee of a power has no interest in the
property subject to the power of appointment until it is exercised in his favor, the
statute lends some support to the argument that no ta..'\': is imposed when a power is
created.
23. VA. CoDE ANN. § 58-157 (1950), in which the Court found statutory authority
[or application of the ta..'\': to interests coming "into possession of beneficiaries by the
e.'\':ercise or relinquishment of powers," makes no distinction between general and special
powers.
24. VA. CoDE ANN. § 58-524(11) (Supp. 1958).
25. VA. CoDE ANN. § 58-516 (1950).
26. VA. CoDE ANN.§ 58-406 (Supp. 1958').
27. 200 Va. 431, 105 S.E.2d 814 0958).
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viduals, they remain reportable by railway companies. The word "of'' as
used in the clause of the statute excepting ''bonds . . . of public service
corporations" was given its dictionary definition, "belonging to" or "denoting
possession or ownership." Accordingly, the tax was sustained. The Court
found additional support for the result reached in the clear intent of the
General Assembly not to relieve public service corporations from the payment of taxes on bonds and notes is...<:ned by states other than Virginia.

